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 1 1. Introduction 
This report reviews the evidence on the impact of regeneration on poverty in 
Northern Ireland. It is part of a wider research project for the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation that looks at the impact of regeneration on poverty across the UK. A 
main report - Regeneration and poverty: evidence and policy review (Crisp et al., 
2014) -  comprehensively summarises all the evidence across the UK. This report on 
Northern Ireland is one of three smaller reviews produced, respectively, for Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland to ensure full discussion of the distinct approaches 
taken across the UK with regard to regeneration as a devolved policy area1. Details 
of the methods used to review the available evidence are provided in the main 
report. 
This review examines regeneration policies and strategies in Northern Ireland from 
the late 1970s to the present day. It then examines anti-poverty policies and 
strategies over the same period and reflects on the degree of connection between 
the two. In particular, it assesses the degree to which area-based regeneration in 
Northern Ireland has been proven to alleviate poverty, with the assistance of 
evaluation studies where available. ‘Regeneration’ includes both urban and rural 
initiatives although the policy area has an urban focus. Most activity involves 
comprehensive area-based programmes in disadvantaged areas, however property-
based schemes are also included due to their claims to benefit communities through 
job creation and other forms of economic development. Some minor programmes 
have been omitted or mentioned only briefly. Space has also not permitted the 
inclusion of an important and problematic related policy area, that of the promotion of 
‘good relations’ between the two main communities in Northern Ireland, on which 
there is an extensive literature. The paper reviews regeneration and anti-poverty 
initiatives chronologically in two sections, divided at 1998 when devolved 
government was introduced following the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement. Each 
section is commented on separately and the paper concludes with more general 
discussion and with brief recommendations on how regeneration could contribute 
more effectively to the reduction of poverty in Northern Ireland. 
The main arguments of the paper are as follows. Regeneration initiatives in Northern 
Ireland have been fragmented both before and after devolution. Fragmentation has 
taken different forms, for example: a large number of initiatives; several initiatives 
taking place in the same areas concurrently; areas receiving funding from different 
programmes; time-limited project funding; displacement of expenditure from 
mainstream budgets. All raise questions about the extent of genuine additionality. 
Despite this, many valuable projects have been funded through regeneration sources 
and evaluations have included impressive outputs relating to job creation and 
physical improvements. This means we have to ask why the same areas continue to 
score highly on deprivation indicators despite considerable additional expenditure 
over the years. 
                                               
1
 The main report and three smaller country reviews are all available at http://www.shu.ac.uk/research/cresr/  
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Northern Ireland’s regeneration programmes have usually been comprehensive and 
based on disadvantaged areas, with the exception of social housing investment 
which has been undertaken separately by the Northern Ireland Housing Executive. 
Competition for programme inclusion was never used in the region. Area-based 
initiatives have consistently addressed income poverty through economic 
development measures such as job training and creation, business support and the 
social economy; this has also been a feature of the small number of property-based 
initiatives over the years. There has been awareness of the importance of tackling 
social exclusion that pre-dates New Labour’s election in 1997, perhaps due to the 
importance of European Union funding which adopted the concept earlier.  
Northern Ireland’s anti-poverty strategies, unlike regeneration, have adopted a 
‘mainstreaming’ approach. They have had limited success, although the spatial 
component of disadvantage has always been recognised and regeneration is seen 
as an important part of these strategies. Anti-poverty work has always been more 
explicit than regeneration about the need to close the gap between the Protestant 
and Catholic communities, perhaps because the statistics in relation to poverty and 
unemployment are unequivocal whereas the regeneration picture is more complex. 
The two policy areas are connected strongly through the concepts of social exclusion 
and multiple deprivation, and (where it can be measured) it is arguable that 
regeneration has contributed to reducing social exclusion in Northern Ireland. It is 
less clear that regeneration has contributed to reducing income poverty. 
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2 2. Regeneration and anti-
poverty initiatives 
2.1. Regeneration and anti-poverty policies 1977-1998 
2.1.1. Regeneration initiatives 1977-1998 
Urban renewal in the 1970s was focused on housing improvements and better 
transport planning (Cebulla, 1994), with no identifiable activity in rural areas. As in 
the rest of the UK, there was no overarching regeneration strategy in Northern 
Ireland during this period. Northern Ireland’s first targeted urban regeneration 
initiative was the Belfast Areas of Need in 1977, established in response to a report 
which identified the main problems as high unemployment, poverty, housing 
condition and overcrowding, lack of skills, and disability (BASSN, 1977 in Cebulla, 
1994). In addition, of course, by 1977 residents of these areas had also experienced 
nearly ten years of the Northern Ireland ‘troubles’. Around £12m was targeted on the 
worst 20 wards in the city, including recreation and leisure centres, environmental 
improvements projects, schools renovation and neighbourhood business units, 
administered by statutory authorities (Murtagh, 1995). An updated report in 1987 
showed that wards and sub-areas identified as the most disadvantaged in 1977 had 
remained so (PPRU, 1987 in Cebulla, 1994; Hughes and Carmichael, 1998). 
The more substantial Belfast Action Teams (BATs) and Making Belfast Work (MBW) 
programmes followed in 1987 and 1988 respectively, and were amalgamated in 
1994 (McKibben, 2000). Nine BATs were established between 1987 and 1991 by the 
Department of the Environment, and spent around £19.7m in areas of social and 
economic deprivation with the aim of creating employment opportunities, better co-
ordination of public services and improving the local environment (Hodgett and 
Johnson, 2001; Birrell, 1994). An evaluation showed the focus to have been on 
community development, with only 11 per cent of funding relating to employment (PA 
Cambridge Consultants, 1992 in Birrell, 1994). The influential Making Belfast Work 
programme was launched in 1988, revised in 1995 and continued in some form until 
2000. It covered the 32 most deprived electoral wards in the Greater Belfast area 
and aimed to improve employment opportunities and quality of life. Although it is 
generally accepted that the programme included attempts to improve community 
relations (e.g. Hodgett and Johnson, 2001), it was not stated explicitly in the aims 
and objectives. The programme was administered by the Northern Ireland Office until 
1994 and then transferred to the Department of the Environment. It was intended 
that any project would be funded for a maximum of three years, after which 
departments should ‘mainstream’ successful initiatives, however this did not always 
happen (Quirk and McLaughlin, 1996). 
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The early years of MBW were not very successful, making little impact on 
unemployment and small business start-ups and without much private sector 
involvement (Birrell and Wilson, 1993 in Hart and White, 1999). The programme was 
relaunched in 1995 (Table 1) with programme expenditure reorientated towards 
community benefits and away from enterprise and employment (McKibben, 2000) 
and with a Partnership Board structure to increase local involvement in 
implementation and programme development (Hughes and Carmichael, 1998). 
Table 1: Making Belfast Work Mission Statement and implementation 
framework, 1995 
Mission Statement: To strengthen and better target the efforts being made by the community, 
the private sector and the Government in addressing the economic, educational, social, health 
and environmental problems facing people living in the most disadvantaged areas of Belfast. 
Aims 
To increase opportunities for residents of MBW 
areas to secure employment 
To improve the quality of life for residents 
of MBW areas 
Mechanisms 
A strategy focused on promoting the city for 
investment; access to further education and 
training; expansion of the social economy and 
incentives for small businesses. 
A social strategy focused on community 
development, children and young people, 
and partnership working. 
Sources: McKibben (2000: 295); Deloitte & Touche (1997). 
A later evaluation concluded that ‘MBW had been able to deliver a very significant 
volume of benefits which were relevant to meeting the socio-economic and 
environmental needs of the residents of inner Belfast’ (Deloitte & Touche: 1997:16) 
and specifically mentioned low deadweight. Programme expenditure of £93.1m 
between 1992 ands 1996 resulted in net additional benefits including: 1,900 jobs 
created; assistance to 4,130 small businesses; and 16,633 trainees. Although 
outputs were not compared to wider areas in Northern Ireland, a comparison with the 
Inner City Task Force Programme in England showed that Task Forces achieved 
more in terms of job creation and small business assistance, whereas MBW 
benefitted communities rather more (Deloitte & Touche, 1997). The overall 
expenditure figure for MBW is estimated at £275m, which funded a total of 350 
projects (NIA, 2007). 
The parallel programme in Derry/Londonderry was the Londonderry Initiative (1988 – 
2004), with around £42m spent overall (NIA, 2007). The programme sought to 
‘enhance the effectiveness of public policy and to accelerate the social, economic 
and environmental regeneration process of Londonderry’ (Cebulla, 1995: 63). There 
were three strands: a Town Centre Development Programme (TCDP): grant 
assistance for private sector renovation of derelict land; a Community Action 
Programme (CAP) which supported fifty community-based projects; and a City 
Promotion Programme (CPP) for city marketing. CAP projects were located in areas 
of multiple deprivation as identified in the 1981 Census. The Initiative was managed 
by the Londonderry Development Office. After a review in 1995-96, more resources 
were provided directly to the community sector (NIA, 2007). The programme was 
evaluated in 1993 (Cebulla, 1995). Although a small number of jobs had been 
created, evaluators found ‘no evidence of any marked improvement in the social and 
economic conditions of residents in the Community Action Programme areas’ (p.xii) 
but commented that this would be unlikely in such a short period and that a more 
strategic and long-term approach to tackling deprivation was necessary.  
Returning to Belfast, the Laganside Corporation (1989 – 2007) was established to 
regenerate Belfast’s waterfront. Laganside was an Urban Development Corporation, 
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however, unlike British UDCs it was not given planning powers (OECD, 2000). The 
area is now managed by the Department for Social Development. By 1998, funding 
sources included: £55m from regional government, £29m from the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), £40m for Belfast’s Millennium Project (the 
Odyssey Arena) and additional sums from Lottery and EU PEACE funds (OECD, 
2000). By the end of 2007, a investment leverage ratio of 1:5 was predicted, to 
produce 14,700 jobs located in the area (Laganside Corporation, 2007). The 
programme was largely concerned with improving infrastructure, attracting private 
investment and building apartments for the private market, and it had little to offer the 
more disadvantaged communities nearby (Neill, 1995) despite the introduction of a 
Community Strategy in 2003 (Laganside Corporation, 2003; Sterrett et al, 2005). The 
original redevelopment area of 140 hectares was expanded to include the old 
municipal Gasworks site and, in 1997, the nearby Cathedral Quarter. The Cathedral 
Quarter’s focus is on cultural and property-based initiatives (McManus and 
Carruthers, 2014) with a strong ‘creative class’ emphasis.  
As part of the Community Strategy, the Belfast Gasworks Employment Matching 
Service (GEMS) began work in 2002 with the aims of developing links between local 
employers and the unemployed in the surrounding disadvantaged areas (Hemphill et 
al, 2006). Initial funding of £1.2m was provided by local and central government, the 
EU and a private donation (Plöger, 2008). The degree of additionality achieved by 
Belfast GEMS remains unclear; however the project was innovative and operated in 
areas where few other such services were available. The project continued to 
expand and to attract funding from other sources; by 2008, it had achieved: jobs for 
over 1,000 people; employability training courses completed by around 800; and 
contacts with over 400 employers (Plöger, 2008). It is still in existence today as 
GEMS NI.  
Two targeted schemes ran across Northern Ireland during the 1990s, both funded by 
the DoE and the International Fund for Ireland (IFI)2. They were based on physical 
regeneration but effectively integrated community involvement: The Community 
Economic Regeneration Scheme (CERS) supported five projects in Belfast and 
Derry, to provide large centres including both commercial and community facilities 
(Birrell, 1994). The Community Regeneration and Improvement Special Programme 
(CRISP) supported community-led economic projects, grant for property renovation 
and environmental improvements in towns and villages (DoENI, 1999). A total of 
£58m was spent on 99 projects in 87 locations, with grant representing 80 per cent of 
costs (DSD, 2012a). Both programmes were regarded as having considerable impact 
including some evidence of cross-community working, with ‘strong multiplier effects 
in areas of disadvantage but limited evidence of the experience being built upon in 
subsequent policies’ (DSD, 2012a:17).  
Three programmes for rural areas also ran during this period. The Rural 
Development Initiative (RDI) (1991-99) was co-ordinated by the Department of 
Agriculture (DANI) and spent £8m on eight Strategy Action Groups to support small 
projects and lever in other funds. It was implemented by a new arms length body, the 
Rural Development Council, and community involvement was handled by another 
new organisation, the Rural Community Network (Greer and Murray, 2003). Both 
organisations still exist today. Hence funding and implementation structures set rural 
regeneration apart from its urban counterpart. The RDI achieved impressive outputs 
including creation of over 1,000 jobs, 450 new business start-ups and the 
                                               
2
 ‘The International Fund for Ireland (IFI) is an independent organisation established in 1986 and funded by 
contributions from United States of America, the European Union, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.... The 
Fund’s mission is to tackle the underlying causes of sectarianism and violence and to build reconciliation 
between people and within and between communities throughout the island of Ireland’ 
http://www.internationalfundforireland.com/ last accessed 20
th
 October 2013. 
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involvement of 450 community groups in the programme (DANI data in Greer and 
Murray, 2003). However, as in some other programmes, it is not clear whether these 
outputs might overlap with those of the EU INTERREG I and IIA programmes 
(economic development in border regions and cross border co-operation 
respectively) and LEADER I and II (rural development), which both ran concurrently 
from 1991-93 and 1994-99 in their two phases. An assessment of the LEADER II 
partnership process concluded that, along with quantitative outputs, projects 
benefitted local partnership working and capacity building, and encouraged a more 
diversified rural economy (Scott, 2004). 
Three further funding schemes contributed to urban regeneration during this period, 
although their primary purpose was economic development and they were not 
exclusively targeted according to need: Urban Development Grant, the 
Environmental Improvements Scheme, and the Comprehensive Development 
Scheme (NIA, 2007). Jobs were created in all cases although there was concern 
about deadweight in the first two cases (Cebulla 1994 and 1995; DSD, 2012a). All 
three schemes are still in existence today. 
EU funding in Northern Ireland 
EU funding has been of great importance in Northern Ireland. The region had 
Objective One status from 1989-2006 (three funding periods) and Objective Two 
transitional funds from 2007-13 and for 2014-20. The two programmes from the 
1977-98 period outlined below are URBAN I and the more extensive PEACE I (EU 
Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation Programme). It is 
arguable whether the PEACE programme is a ‘regeneration’ initiative as it is not 
targeted exclusively on areas of deprivation, however as will become clear its aims 
over its three phases have complemented area-based initiatives when implemented 
in disadvantaged areas. 
Northern Ireland’s URBAN I programme (1994-99) focused on areas of deprivation in 
Belfast and Derry, and funded projects connected with new economic activities, 
employment, improvements in health and social security provision, improvement of 
infrastructure and the environment, and housing refurbishment (Murtagh, 2001a). 
The Belfast sub-programme consisted of the Early Years Initiative, Greater Shankill 
Partnership (Protestant area) and Upper Springfield Project, Upper Springfield 
Development Trust (Catholic area). In Derry the targeted areas were the Catholic 
Bogside/Brandywell and the Creggan, and the small Protestant enclave, the 
Fountain. The EU contribution was £13.4m, which attracted match funding to total 
around £23m (PWC, 2001). The evaluation reported a comparatively small number 
of jobs created (252, assumed fully additional) but better outputs in other areas such 
as participation in training courses, the setting up of new community projects, and 
the involvement of volunteers and community groups (PWC, 2001). Communities 
had been successfully involved in project development and delivery but had 
expressed frustration at the slow pace and the bureaucracy; links with other 
programmes were good including some leverage; community capacity and 
partnership governance structures improved and the different needs of Catholic and 
Protestant communities were recognised (Murtagh, 2001a; Hughes and Carmichael, 
1998); the comprehensive area-based focus was regarded as beneficial; but few 
projects were continued as mainstream initiatives; and the baseline analysis needed 
to be improved (PWC, 2001; DSD, 2003a). 
The EU Special Support for Peace and Reconciliation PEACE I programme (1995-
99) aimed to ‘reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society and to 
promote reconciliation by increasing economic development and employment, 
promoting urban and rural regeneration, developing cross-border cooperation and 
extending social inclusion’ (PWC, 2003: 8).  PEACE I’s rationale was that greater 
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prosperity and social cohesion would assist with peace and reconciliation. However, 
funds were made available across Northern Ireland (and the border counties of the 
Irish Republic) rather than targeted on disadvantaged areas. Nonetheless, the 
programme did make connections between peace, reconciliation and aspects of 
regeneration and anti-poverty work, unlike earlier programmes such as MBW. 
Programme funding consisted of €500m overall from the EU, of which €400m went to 
Northern Ireland (PWC, 2003), with a total expenditure of €667m after match funding 
(NIA, 2011). Programme management was carried out by the Department of Finance 
and Personnel in Northern Ireland. The most notable administrative aspect of the 
programme was the creation of 26 District Partnerships in Northern Ireland, with 
membership divided equally between local councils, the community and voluntary 
sectors, and other local interests, such as the private sector and (unusually for the 
UK) the trades unions. The Partnerships have been acknowledged as a crucial step 
forward in improving community relations and opportunities for public participation 
(Hughes et al, 1998; Murtagh, 2001b; Buchanan, 2008). However, they only 
distributed 20 per cent of programme funds.  
The PEACE I evaluation revealed that grant expenditure was almost 100 per cent 
despite the complexity of delivery mechanisms. During the course of the programme 
the balance of expenditure shifted towards social inclusion and away from attracting 
investment. Although funding was widely distributed geographically, there was a 
skewing of resources towards disadvantaged areas. A wide range of activities were 
funded, for example education, training and development, community development, 
economic development and childcare provision; jobs created were estimated at 7-
8,000 and between 60-70 per cent of participants in training and development 
projects progressed either to employment, education or further training. The 
programme increased community involvement and cross-community activities. More 
resources were allocated to Catholic areas but when patterns of need were 
considered this did not appear unreasonable. There was little deadweight, with 
additionality observed in 95 per cent of projects. The programme acted as a ‘catalyst 
for change’ but it remained difficult to assess the longer term effect on community 
relations although it was successful in facilitating participation from previously hard to 
reach groups including victims of violence and politically motivated ex-prisoners. The 
lack of an ongoing evaluation plan throughout the programme caused difficulties with 
the final evaluation (PWC, 2003). Thus the programme may have assisted with 
community cohesion but would have made less impact on poverty. 
2.1.2. Anti-poverty initiatives 1977-1998 
Strategic work to address poverty in Northern Ireland during this period consisted 
only of one programme, Targeting Social Need. In addition, the small but influential 
EU Poverty 3 programme in Brownlow, Co. Armagh (1989-94) aimed to build 
community cohesion, improve the local economy and to address poverty and 
deprivation in the area. The programme received £1m from Poverty 3 and match 
funding brought the total expenditure to £2.2m. Although the programme became an 
early good practice example in terms of community involvement, partnership working 
and the social economy, little progress was made in reducing unemployment (Bailey, 
1995).  
Targeting Social Need (TSN) was launched in 1991 and continued until its 
replacement by New TSN in 1998. TSN attempted to ‘mainstream’ anti-poverty 
initiatives by ensuring all government departments orientated their programmes 
towards those in greatest need. The policy recognised inequality between the two 
communities, which is more overtly stated than in most regeneration programmes. 
However, whilst TSN stemmed from a realisation within the Northern Ireland Civil 
Service (NICS) that 'on all major social and economic indicators, Catholics are worse 
off than Protestants', the approach adopted by government tried also to encompass 
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the view held within the NICS that 'socioeconomic need existed in both communities’ 
(NIA, 2001: 1). Priority areas were identified through the Robson index of multiple 
deprivation, derived mainly from the 1991 Census. TSN was implemented by the 
government’s Central Community Relations Unit (CCRU) in conjunction with the 
Department of Finance and Personnel; the unclear division of responsibilities was 
identified as one reason for the lack of effectiveness of the programme (Quirk and 
McLaughlin, 1996). 
TSN acknowledged that poverty and social exclusion were multi-faceted and that 
cross-departmental action was necessary.  However, the programme faced 
resistance from some departments and was not regarded as having been a success. 
Reviews found that the majority of government departments thought they were 
already addressing social need; thus there was little evidence of TSN influencing 
departmental policy-making and expenditure patterns. Departments did not monitor 
outputs by religious background and resisted the suggestion that they should do so; 
therefore it was not possible to measure the results of the programme in relation to 
one of its key objectives (Quirk and McLaughlin, 1996; Osbourne, 1996). Under 
these circumstances, Quirk and McLaughlin (1996: 178) identified the gains from 
targeted regeneration programmes as ‘the principal face of TSN’.  
2.1.3. Analysis of regeneration and anti-poverty policies 1977-1998 
Regeneration during the period 1977-1998 achieved a great deal but faced many of 
the same issues as elsewhere in the UK along with the major additional factor of the 
troubles - which interestingly is barely mentioned in most of the literature and 
evaluation documents. As in the rest of the UK, there was no overarching 
regeneration strategy at the time. The most common structure was comprehensive 
area-based initiatives, although housing was generally omitted and dealt with 
separately by the Northern Ireland Housing Executive. Areas were selected using 
indices of multiple deprivation based largely on Census data. A small number of 
property-based programmes offered limited benefits to disadvantaged areas 
although they did claim to create jobs. Programmes were skewed towards urban 
areas, particularly Belfast.  
Regeneration initiatives included community development activities but did not 
emphasise the promotion of better relations between the two communities until 
PEACE I and to a lesser extent URBAN I in the mid-1990s after the paramilitary 
ceasefires. The dual problems of weaker community capacity in Protestant areas 
and statistical evidence of higher deprivation in Catholic areas were identified. A 
strong partnership ethos was developed (including in rural areas), but without much 
private sector input. EU and IFI funding was extremely important as part of 
regeneration funding packages. Evaluations provided quantitative evidence of gains 
such as job creation and access to training, as well as qualitative gains in relation to 
capacity building. Improvements to infrastructure were also made. However, 
questions about the accuracy of some evaluation figures remain, for example 
whether double counting of outputs took place in some cases in programmes funded 
by both the Northern Ireland government and the European Union. It remains 
important to ask about the long-term impact of these regeneration initiatives, given 
that many of the same areas continue to be identified as disadvantaged today. 
It is arguable that neither the small Poverty 3 programme nor TSN were actually anti-
poverty initiatives at all. Both shared with regeneration programmes the use of a 
multiple deprivation index to target resources and were about tackling social 
exclusion rather than poverty. An important difference between regeneration and 
anti-poverty policy was the more overt recognition of greater deprivation in Catholic 
communities by the TSN programme, however the aim of closing the gap proved 
impossible to measure. Although TSN recognised the multi-faceted element of 
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poverty and social exclusion, a mainstreaming approach was unsuccessful and 
arguably less effective in tackling poverty than the regeneration programmes which 
included job creation and employment training. There is no evidence of 
organisational synergy between regeneration and anti-poverty policy: urban 
regeneration was co-ordinated by the Department of the Environment, rural 
regeneration by the Department of Agriculture, EU programmes by the Department 
of Finance and Personnel along with aspects of TSN, and TSN also by the Central 
Community Relations Unit.  
The rationales for regeneration and anti-poverty programmes in the period 1977-
1998 were very similar, underpinned by the concepts of multiple deprivation and 
social exclusion. The emphasis on economic development was grounded in an 
awareness of chronic unemployment problems and the need to encourage private 
sector investment, a standard UK regeneration approach which almost totally 
discounted the presence of the troubles and, after 1994, the fragile state of the 
‘peace process’. A recognition of the importance of community development and 
social programmes was supplemented after 1994 by a more overt expectation that 
community relations would improve as a by-product of tackling social exclusion, a 
hope that now appears somewhat naive.  
2.2. Regeneration and anti-poverty policies 1999-2013 
The Good Friday/Belfast Agreement and the Northern Ireland Act 1998 established 
devolved regional government in Northern Ireland with a wide range of 
responsibilities including urban and rural regeneration, housing, planning, health, 
education, transport planning, economic development and tourism. Welfare benefits 
are administered under a parity agreement with Great Britain. An enforced coalition 
of four (now five) political parties and a cross-community voting procedure for 
controversial issues sought to ensure agreement in a political system based upon 
national allegiance rather than on social and economic issues. Eleven government 
departments were set up - now twelve, with the subsequent devolution of the 
administration of justice. Ministers sit in an Executive and are accountable to scrutiny 
committees and to the 108-member Northern Ireland Assembly. The Assembly and 
Executive were suspended between October 2002 and May 2007, during which time 
the administrative structures were accountable to ‘direct rule’ Ministers at 
Westminster and to the UK Parliament. The period of suspension did not prevent a 
number of important regeneration and anti-poverty initiatives being introduced.  
2.2.1. Regeneration initiatives 1999-2013 
Following devolution, urban regeneration has become the responsibility of the 
Department for Social Development (DSD) and rural regeneration is overseen by the 
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD). EU programmes are 
administered by the Special EU Programmes Board (SEUPB), reporting to the 
Department of Finance and Personnel (DFP). An ongoing Reform of Public 
Administration programme aims to reduce the number of local councils from 26 to 11 
in 2015 and to devolve responsibility for most regeneration from regional to local 
level, along with decisions on Area Plans and development control. Social housing 
will continue to be managed at regional level but a restructuring is taking place in 
order to bring in more private finance. A promising aspect of the reforms is the 
introduction of community planning: a process led by the new councils to develop a 
shared vision for the area, involving a partnership approach and a long-term strategic 
analysis (DoE, 2013), as has been done with variations in other parts of the UK 
(Pemberton et al, 2014). Community Plans present an opportunity for local 
interpretation of both regeneration and anti-poverty priorities, along with the potential 
for greater synergy between the two policy areas. Strategic approaches to both 
regeneration and anti-poverty remain at the regional level.  
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Strategic approaches to regeneration 
Northern Ireland’s approach to regeneration in this period was influenced by New 
Labour’s National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (acknowledged in DSD, 
2003a; Adamson (2010) also notes the influence of the Welsh ‘Communities First’ 
programme). Labour’s ‘what matters is what works’ approach also led to 
reconsideration of programme evaluation. A review of urban regeneration 
performance highlighted inadequacies in data collection which had hampered 
previous evaluations and recommended better baseline data and co-ordination 
between agencies (Tyler et al, 2002). 
Northern Ireland’s first regional strategic approach to the regeneration of 
disadvantaged areas was set out in People and Place: A Strategy for Neighbourhood 
Renewal (DSD, 2003b). The Strategy aimed to ‘close the gap between the quality of 
life for people in the most deprived neighbourhoods and the quality of life for the rest 
of society’ through improved access to services and opportunities; and by improving 
the environment (DSD, 2003b: 21). There were four strategic objectives with 
associated targets: community renewal; economic renewal; social renewal and 
physical renewal (although social housing was not included). The programme was 
also intended to tackle community divisions, so that ‘integration of communities must 
be encouraged and segregation discouraged’ (DSD, 2003b:5) and areas which have 
‘suffered the worst impact of the troubles, must not lose out on the social and 
economic benefits that the ‘peace dividend’ has brought for many of our citizens’ 
(DSD, 2003b:2). However, measurement of community cohesion was not included in 
the programme targets. 
Implementation was through 36 Neighbourhood Renewal Areas (NRAs) within the 
most deprived ten per cent of urban areas, selected using the Noble Index of Multiple 
Deprivation (15 in Belfast, six in Derry and 15 in other towns and cities). Areas were 
not coterminous with ward or electoral district boundaries because the DSD resolved 
that they should be ‘a workable size; must complement and build upon existing 
initiatives and must ‘make sense to the people who lived in them’ (DSD, 2010:26). 
Boundaries were subject to consultation and some existing projects just outside 
NRAs were supported if they contributed to targets (DSD, 2010). Disadvantaged 
areas too small to quality for NRAs (usually under 1,000 population) were funded as 
Small Pockets of Deprivation (SPODs) and 17 had been identified by 2009. This part 
of the programme was implemented in conjunction with the Housing Executive (DSD, 
2012a). Once NRAs were selected, Neighbourhood Action Plans were put together 
by Neighbourhood Partnerships for each area, including the community, voluntary, 
statutory and private sectors. This process took several years. The programme’s 
timescale was originally 7-10 years, but subsequently this was revised to 12 years, to 
end in 2015. 
A Mid-Term Evaluation of ‘People and Place’ found that a total of £91m had been 
spent: £62m was revenue and £29m capital, with average expenditure per NRA of 
£2.5m and average per capita spend of £327 (DSD, 2010). Additionality was 
generally found to be high. The evaluation was necessarily incomplete because 
some targets required information from the 2011 Census to measure progress from 
2001. However, it was also concluded that the impact of two strategic objectives 
could not be measured at all. The community renewal targets had not been clearly 
defined and there was no baseline position; the physical renewal targets did not have 
baseline data, and in particular it appears that resident satisfaction was not 
measured. The population of NRAs had fallen by 0.9 per cent whereas Northern 
Ireland’s population had risen by 5.1 per cent, thus arguably NRAs had not been 
stabilised (DSD, 2010).  
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There was an increase in jobs in NRA areas (14 per cent compared to eight per cent 
in non-NRA areas) and a fall in benefit claims for those seeking work, but economic 
inactivity due to ill health remained high. There were improved education outputs 
although some health outcomes were not so positive, including an increase in 
suicide rates to double that of non-NRA areas. Crime and anti-social behaviour had 
both fallen, and other benefits included improvements to ‘sports facilities, childcare 
facilities, street lighting, community centres, business units, tree planting and play 
parks’ (DSD, 2010: 6). A subsequent composite indicators report (DSD, 2012b) 
confirmed this picture but noted that the gap had closed further in many areas e.g. 
crime, education, teenage births. The SPOD programme was evaluated separately. 
It had funded environmental improvements and community projects which were 
valued but possibly included high deadweight given the responsibilities of councils 
and the Housing Executive for these areas. Economic impact was low due to the 
small size of the SPOD areas (DSD, 2012a).  
Therefore there were many lessons to be learnt from the implementation of ‘People 
and Place’. The programme is due to end in 2015. From this date, local councils will 
be expected to follow the Urban Regeneration and Community Development Policy 
Framework (DSD, 2013), with a statutory requirement to report their activities to 
DSD. There are four policy objectives: to tackle area-based deprivation; to 
strengthen the competitiveness of our towns and cities; to improve linkages between 
areas of need and areas of opportunity; and to develop more cohesive and engaged 
communities (DSD, 2013: iii). The remit is wider than ‘People and Place’ covering 
both improvements to disadvantaged areas and property-based regeneration, with a 
new emphasis on making connections between the two. The Framework emphasises 
the important of monitoring and evaluation, perhaps due to the problems 
experienced in the past and perhaps also because the Framework will be 
implemented by eleven different councils (separate implementation guidance will be 
produced). There is a requirement to use the outcomes-based ‘Logic Model’ and a 
set of indicators is provided, along with a list of 22 other policies or strategies that the 
Framework’s activities should take into account is provided, including anti-poverty 
strategies (DSD, 2013). Some work is being done by the voluntary sector to develop 
outcomes-based evaluation systems appropriate for the URCDF as well as for the 
new Community Plans (Community Places, 2012; CENI, 2013). The Framework 
makes clear that finances will be constrained, and provides an annex note on 
potential ‘innovative’ sources such as Tax Increment Financing, community bonds, 
community infrastructure levy, community asset transfer and ‘meanwhile use’ (short-
term use of vacant buildings before permanent replacement activity is found) (DSD, 
2013: iii). The Northern Ireland government is particularly interested in encouraging 
community asset transfer, which is less advanced in Northern Ireland than in other 
UK jurisdictions (Murtagh et al, 2012). 
Property-based regeneration 
The Northern Ireland Executive has adopted a neoliberal approach to economic 
development and urban regeneration (Nagle, 2009; Murtagh, 2011; O’Dowd and 
Komarova, 2013), and thus raised the profile of property-based regeneration. The 
Ilex Urban Regeneration Company in Derry/Londonderry is Northern Ireland’s only 
URC. Ilex was established in 2003 to create and promote a co-ordinated 
regeneration of the Derry City Council area and to manage its implementation in co-
operation with partners; and to secure the economic, social and physical 
regeneration of the ex-military sites of Ebrington and Fort George (Ilex, 2012). The 
refurbished Ebrington site played an important role in the 2013 City of Culture and a 
pedestrian Peace Bridge, opened in 2012 and funded by PEACE III, has made a 
considerable positive impact on the city. Expenditure during 2003-2010 totalled 
£6.3m capital and £15m revenue, plus £14.5m for the Peace bridge. Ilex was 
reviewed in 2011 and many implementation difficulties were identified (BDO, 2011). 
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The development of the Fort George site has been taken over by DSD from 2013 
(Ilex, 2012) and the One Plan regeneration strategy for the city is jointly implemented 
by Ilex and the City Council (Derry City Council, 2010). It may be that Ilex will not be 
sustainable as a separate organization for much longer. 
Belfast’s most significant recent property-based regeneration project is the Titanic 
Quarter waterfront, led by a private company, Harcourt Developments. The 
development began in 2005 and Phase One included 475 apartments, offices, a 
further education college, an hotel and a new building for the Public Records Office 
of Northern Ireland. Phase Two will include more apartments and other mixed uses, 
although, due to the economic situation, the very successful ‘Titanic Belfast’ museum 
is the only planned element that has been completed to date. A successful film 
studio has also been developed through ‘meantime use’ of a derelict building. Public 
funders have included government departments, Belfast City Council and PEACE III. 
A Memorandum of Understanding with Belfast City Council in relation to funding for 
Titanic Belfast was intended to yield local jobs, however the results were 
disappointing, generally acknowledged to be a result of poor drafting of the 
agreement. Titanic Quarter is beginning to inspire a sizeable literature, most of which 
highlights its contribution to the neoliberalisation (market-led development) of the city 
and is critical of its inability to engage with  nearby disadvantaged areas (Neill, 2011; 
Coyles, 2013; Ramsey, 2013; Muir, 2013; Neill et al, 2014). The overall development 
has not been evaluated. 
EU programmes 
Two EU Special Support for Peace and Reconciliation PEACE programmes ran 
during this period: PEACE II (2000-06) and PEACE III (2007-13). PEACE IV is likely 
to run from 2014-2020. The strategic aim of the PEACE II programme was ‘to 
reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society and to promote 
reconciliation’; a shortened version of the PEACE I aim. Five programme priorities 
and 34 measures included a number that were relevant to regeneration including 
supporting competitiveness, rural diversification, technology support, support for 
women’s employment, the social economy, active citizenship, improving weak 
community infrastructure, rural areas and capacity building, tourism and rural 
development (SEUPB, 2000). Although the specific objectives were focused on 
benefitting those most affected by the conflict (rather than on social exclusion as in 
PEACE I), much of the cost of the conflict had been borne in disadvantaged areas. 
A total of €978.5m was available, including 25 per cent match funding from other 
sources. A new Managing Authority, the Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB) 
was established for both Irish jurisdictions under the Good Friday Agreement. There 
were organisational difficulties with the programme which led to its extension from 
four to six years. The successful PEACE I District Partnership structure was replaced 
by Local Strategy Partnerships (LSPs), which were responsible for the administration 
of Programme Priority 3 (locally based regeneration and development strategies) in 
Northern Ireland (around €86m); unlike the District Partnerships, LSPs had no 
responsibility for spending on social inclusion. LSP membership reduced civil society 
representation from two-thirds to half. The new governance arrangements were 
unpopular with community groups, who saw themselves being marginalised 
compared with PEACE I (Acheson and Williamson, 2007; Buchanan, 2008).  
Evaluations revealed positive programme outcomes despite two main difficulties. 
First, the context was problematic, with the Northern Ireland Assembly suspended 
from 2002-2007, evidence of deepening community divisions, and a sluggish 
economy (PWC, 2005). LSPs felt particularly unsupported given the political vacuum 
(Navigate Change Consulting, 2009). Second, complex administrative processes 
were off-putting and may have led to spending delays (PWC, 2005). The evaluation 
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also suggested a more detailed assessment of the contribution of projects towards 
peace and reconciliation (PWC, 2005), a point that was taken up in the evaluation 
approach to PEACE III (NIA, 2013). Finally, greater effort was needed to involve the 
private sector in partnership working (PWC, 2005). It does not appear that a full ex 
post evaluation of PEACE II was carried out, however, a supplementary impact 
report (McClure Watters, 2006) provided some interim outputs for 2000-2006, 
including: support for almost 5,400 small businesses, resulting in the creation of 
almost 1,950 jobs; and 46,000 project participants, of which 25,000 were in rural 
areas (SEUPB press release, 24 November 2006). A separate evaluation of LSPs 
found they had improved partnership working and cross-community contacts, as well 
as achieving good programme delivery outputs. LSP members considered the 
partnerships to have had a positive impact on peace and reconciliation (Navigate 
Change Consulting, 2009). All in all, ‘peace building, economic renewal and capacity 
building have all been positively influenced by the programme’ (NIA, 2011:5).  
The current PEACE III Programme (2007-13) is smaller than its predecessors 
(€225m EU funds; €333m overall) because from 2007 Northern Ireland (and the 
border counties of the Irish Republic) were designated as areas in transition away 
from Objective 1. The Operational Programme described the continuing barriers to 
reconciliation, in the context of a weak economy, as the programme rationale 
(SEUPB, 2007a). The aim remained the same as PEACE II, but focused more 
specifically on addressing the physical segregation of communities, with a 
commitment to prioritise ‘areas and groups that have been affected by the conflict 
and experience particular problems of segregation, marginalisation and isolation’ 
(SEUPB, 2007a: 49), both urban and rural. Unlike previous PEACE programmes, 
there was no template for partnership structures. 
A new supplementary evaluation feature was introduced into PEACE III, the Aid for 
Peace model (PWC, 2007; Bush, 2009), which was adopted to more accurately 
assess the peacebuilding impact of an intervention through four main components: 
analysing the peacebuilding needs of an area, defining the peacebuilding relevance 
of the intervention, assessing the effects of the conflict on the intervention (i.e. the 
risk that the intervention will not succeed within its context) and evaluating the 
peacebuilding effects of the project including an assessment of project indicators 
(NIA, 2013). The mid-term evaluation of PEACE III reported problems with the new 
approach. There had been difficulty translating the new system into measurable 
outcomes and outputs, and some project-specific indicators had no targets. For 
example, two large projects to encourage shared space were regarded as having 
revitalised disadvantaged areas, however economic impact could not be measured 
as no indicators had been set, such as number of jobs created (Cartmin, 2013). 
The smaller URBAN II programme (2002-06) ran in inner North Belfast, targeted for 
its inner city decline, deprivation indicators and severe community divisions (Dunlop 
et al, 2002). The aim of the programme was ‘to regenerate North Belfast into a 
vibrant, safe and viable urban community for its people, its environment and its 
economy’ (DSD, 2001:42), through development of physical, social and ‘people’ 
resources. Funds available totalled €17.1m, of which €10.6m was provided from the 
EU (DSD, 2001); the programme was underspent at €13.8m (Murtagh and 
Copeland, 2008). The programme was implemented by the North Belfast Partnership 
Board, reporting to DSD’s Belfast Regeneration Office, the Department of Finance 
and Personnel and also to a locally based multi-agency Monitoring Committee 
including community representatives and politicians (DSD, 2001).  
URBAN II took place at a difficult time in North Belfast. Civil unrest was acute, 
especially during the early period of the programme; the development of large capital 
projects was also adversely affected by the economic situation. Therefore the grants 
profile was different than expected, with a larger number of small grants (Murtagh 
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and Copeland, 2008) and this may have contributed to the overall programme 
underspend. However, benefits still included: the involvement of 115 community 
organisations; one large and 26 local refurbishment projects; €460,000 leverage of 
private funds into the area; 28 community organisations supported; 876 beneficiaries 
of training, counselling, guidance or employment aid, of whom 20 per cent gained 
employment; 11 social economy projects supported, with 20 jobs created. The 
community-based Monitoring Committee worked well and contributed to improved 
dialogue between the two communities. There was limited deadweight and 
displacement (Murtagh and Copeland, 2008). However, the Operational Programme 
acknowledged links with PEACE II, and smaller programmes (see section below) 
such as the North Belfast Housing Strategy, Community Empowerment Partnerships 
and the refurbishment of Crumlin Road Gaol all attracted different funding sources, 
which raises questions about the efficiency of focusing this scale of resources on a 
very conflicted area within a short space of time. 
Rural programmes 
Rural development has remained heavily dependent on EU programmes. 
INTERREG III (2000-06) and INTERREG IV (2007-13) were programmes to support 
economic development in border areas, thus including some urban settlements 
although much of Ireland’s border area is rural. The aim of INTERREG III was ‘to 
promote sustainable integrated regional development across the eligible region...by 
concentrating on the strategic dimension of cross-border development which 
involves and benefits local communities’ (DFP, 2002: 61). The approach went 
beyond economic development through the production of integrated local 
development strategies including the promotion of civic and community networking to 
improve social cohesion (DFP, 2002). The programme was managed by the SEUPB, 
spent €183m and funded 420 projects (RSM McClure Watters, 2013). Despite a two-
year delay in launching, overall objectives were achieved (NIA, 2011). A case study 
analysis concluded that the programme had supported rural business, promoted 
tourism and the knowledge-based economy, upgraded the infrastructure and 
improved access to cross-border services such as health. Additionality was high 
(Panteia and CSES Strategy and Evaluation Services, 2009). The current 
INTERREG IV (2007-13) has similar intentions, with the eligible area extended to 
include the West Coast of Scotland. Priorities include developing a competitive 
economy, tourism, social cohesion and improved infrastructure (SEUPB, 2007b). 
The programme allocation was €256m. The mid-term evaluation noted 851 projects 
approved with €219m committed expenditure (RSM McClure Watters, 2013). 
The LEADER+ programme (2000-06) has been significant as much for its working 
methods as for its outputs. The programme concentrated on support for private 
sector micro-enterprise development, with the continuation of the Local Action 
Groups network approach from LEADER II. This ‘LEADER approach’ has been 
mainstreamed in Axis 4 of the Northern Ireland Rural Development Programme 
(RDP) 2007-13, as a capacity-building measure to encourage innovative projects. 
The RDP is a requirement under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development, which along with DARD is the funder. The RDP is the closest 
approximation to a strategic approach to rural regeneration and takes forward 
aspects of DARD’s Rural Strategy 2007-13. The RDP is constructed around four 
Axes, to: improve the competitiveness of agriculture and forestry; improve land 
management; improve the quality of life in rural areas and encourage diversification 
of economic activity; and implement the LEADER approach (DARD, 2013). A mid-
term evaluation found that limited data existed to assess the social and economic 
infrastructure development axis, however projects were taking place in rural areas of 
multiple deprivation and, despite concerns about its efficiency, £9m of grants had 
been allocated via the LEADER approach. Over 5,000 people had participated in 
training and over £16m had been provided to the food processing sector (NISRA and 
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RDC, 2009). The RDP is to continue during the 2014-20 period, although a 
disagreement in the NI Executive about funding allocations will mean a reduction in 
the amount available for rural development and environmental initiatives. Under the 
Reform of Public Administration, local councils will play a larger part in delivering the 
RDP and in supporting disadvantaged rural communities more generally.  However, 
a complete transfer of function will not take place.  
Smaller regeneration programmes  
A number of smaller regeneration programmes were instigated during this period, 
some for the whole region and others for urban areas only. Some were subject 
specific and others responded to need in particular small areas. Examples include: 
 1999-2009: Health Action Zones (UK initiative), four projects in Northern Ireland. 
External review (not available) carried out in 2005 which recommended 
continued funding. Integrated into the work of the Public Health Agency in 2009. 
 2000-2012: Northern Ireland Housing Executive Housing and Regeneration 
Strategies, eight 4-year area-based strategies including new and improved 
housing plus community development (Muir, 2004). 
 2001: Sure Start (UK initiative), co-ordination of health, education and parental 
support services to assist the development of pre-school children. Considered 
effective (e.g. Education and Training Inspectorate, 2010). In 2013, 35 
programmes are available in Northern Ireland, covering the top 20 per cent most 
disadvantaged areas measure by the 2010 Index of Multiple Deprivation. It is 
planned to extend services to the 25 per cent most disadvantaged wards by 
2015.  
 2003-09: Community Empowerment Partnerships (CEPs), North Belfast only – 
13 projects £2.3m expenditure, evaluation showed patchy impact given the 
number of other programmes operating in the area (Murtagh et al, 2009). 
 2005: Regeneration of Crumlin Road Gaol and Girdwood Park, North Belfast – 
successful Gaol refurbishment as a tourist attraction but the rest of the site has 
been delayed due to community disagreements about location of housing. A 
Community Hub is in development, led by Belfast City Council and funded by 
Peace III (O’Dowd and Komarova, 2011; Muir, 2014). 
 2006-2015: Areas at Risk Programme – areas just outside Neighbourhood 
Renewal criteria to prevent further economic and social decline. 39 areas have 
received support with limited impact on underlying problems (DSD, 2012a). 
 2006-09: Reimaging Communities – to tackle visible signs of sectarianism and 
racism, with a particular emphasis on the replacement of existing paramilitary 
murals with more positive imagery. Led by the Arts Council of Northern Ireland, 
£3.8m, positive outcomes identified including improved physical environment 
and contribution to local capacity building (Independent Research Solutions, 
2009). 
 2011: Social Investment Fund - Aims to reduce poverty, unemployment and 
physical deterioration in targeted areas across NI (OFMDFM, 2011a). Budget 
£80m. Selection of target areas has been problematic and the first tranche of 
funding was not announced until February 2014, when £33m was allocated to 
23 projects covering employment, childcare, fuel poverty, health and 
infrastructure (OFMDFM web site). 
 2013: Housing Led Regeneration Programme – six pilot areas will develop 
initiatives in conjunction with local residents to include improved housing, 
education and employability projects, tackling anti-social behaviour. 
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Many of the above programmes will connect with Northern Ireland’s primary 
mainstream employability programme, Steps to Work (to be replaced by Steps to 
Success), which is mandatory for longer term Jobseekers’ Allowance claimants and 
available on a voluntary basis to others including non-claimants. The Programme 
began in 2008 and there have been just over 15,000 participants, of whom 35 per 
cent have found employment (DEL, 2013).  
2.2.2. Anti-poverty initiatives 1999-2013 
After devolution, Northern Ireland’s government continued a mainstreaming 
approach to anti-poverty work, focused on tackling social exclusion rather than 
simply income poverty. The over-arching programmes New Targeting Social Need 
(TSN), Lifetime Opportunities and Delivering Social Change have been the 
responsibility of OFMDFM. Rural poverty remains the responsibility of DARD and 
fuel poverty is led by DSD in conjunction with the Housing Executive. Many other 
Assembly level policies and strategies contribute towards tackling poverty and social 
exclusion in Northern Ireland. A recent review identified over ninety examples across 
all government departments (NIA, 2012). 
In Northern Ireland, poverty levels remain high and there is still a difference in the 
extent of poverty between the two main communities (MacInnes et al, 2012). There 
is very little information about poverty and social exclusion in minority ethnic groups 
(Wallace et al, 2013). The economy remains weak in relation to the rest of the UK, 
and more dependent on the public sector. Welfare reform will have a big impact 
(Beatty and Fothergill, 2013) despite difference in implementation of the bedroom 
tax/spare room subsidy, which may only apply to new tenants. Therefore anti-poverty 
strategy in NI is being implemented in the context of a still divided society and a 
weak economy.  
Over-arching programmes 
New TSN was launched by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in July 1998. It 
reiterated the message that had appeared since 1991 about inequality between the 
two communities, making clear that need would be measured objectively through 
deprivation indicators, so that:  
‘while not discriminating in favour of one community and against the 
other, therefore, New TSN should contribute, over time, to the erosion 
of differentials between the communities’ (New TSN Unit, 1998: 2). 
The mainstreaming approach was retained and the New TSN Unit in the Office of the 
First and Deputy First Minister was responsible for co-ordination, with government 
departments required to produce 3-year Action Plans (NIA, 2001). The Promoting 
Social Inclusion (PSI) strand identified Travellers, teenage parents, minority ethnic 
groups and access to services for all at risk of social exclusion, as areas for priority 
action (NIA, 2001). A further imperative for New TSN, and particularly PSI, was the 
Council of Europe’s decision to require National Action Plans for Social Inclusion 
from all member states from 2001 (OFMDFM, 2005).  
Despite some successes, an interim evaluation revealed that the ‘old TSN’ problems 
remained (Deloitte & Touche, 2003a; see also Deloitte & Touche 2003b and 2003c). 
There was no common definition of social need to inform departmental action plans, 
leading to variable interpretation of the policy direction and in particular differences 
about the extent to which employment should be prioritised. Some departments 
argued that they already prioritised disadvantaged groups or that they were 
constrained under the parity agreement. Consultation with non-departmental bodies 
and with the voluntary sector both highlighted lack of additional resources for the 
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programme as an impediment to its effectiveness. There were demands for a more 
meaningful regional strategy to address poverty and social exclusion (Deloitte & 
Touche, 2003a). 
OFMDFM responded to the evaluation with two phases of extensive consultation. 
New research had found that 30 per cent of Northern Ireland’s households were in 
poverty (defined as lacking at least three essentials) compared to 24 per cent in 
Great Britain, and also that differences between Protestant and Catholic 
communities had decreased although an unemployment differential still existed 
(Hillyard et al, 2003). Consultation documents proposed an outcomes-based 
approach with a new emphasis on financial exclusion and the working poor, with the 
overall strategic objective of improving the income and living conditions of the most 
disadvantaged (OFMDFM, 2004; 2005). A reduced number of targets was proposed 
(which still resulted in a substantial monitoring task) around three priorities: building 
capacity to participate in the labour market; increasing employment opportunities and 
removing barriers to employment; and dealing with financial hardship. Despite 
proven need, and the acknowledged shortcomings of New TSN, it was proposed that 
the mainstreaming approach would continue. Consultation revealed ‘a broad 
consensus about the need to prioritise child poverty, maintain a focus on promoting 
social inclusion and the need for long-term targets with resources allocated to meet 
these’ (OFMDFM, 2006: 3). 
The current ‘Lifetime Opportunities’ Anti-Poverty and Social Exclusion Strategy 
(OFMDFM, 2006) aims to work towards the elimination of poverty and social 
exclusion in Northern Ireland by 2020 and to eradicate child poverty by 2020 (both 
EU targets). It is structured around a number of ‘challenges’ (i.e. objectives), many of 
which are very relevant to regeneration: eliminating poverty, eliminating social 
exclusion, tackling area based deprivation, eliminating poverty from rural areas, a 
shared future, tackling inequality in the labour market, tackling health inequalities, 
and tackling cycles of deprivation. Four target groups are identified: early years, 
children and young people, working age adults and older citizens. The impact of 
multiple deprivation was specifically identified and the Strategy references ‘People 
and Place’ (DSD, 2003b) extensively. As with the PEACE programmes, the policy 
connection between better community relations and prosperity is made. There is 
reference to annual monitoring arrangements, however, the Monitoring Framework 
including baseline data did not appear until 2010 (OFMDFM, 2010). There is no 
evidence of annual reports, and there has been no evaluation.  
Two recent small programmes to add to ‘Lifetime Opportunities’ are first, the 2011-15 
Social Protection Fund of £20m a year, to be used to cushion the impact of welfare 
reform. Due to delays in passing the legislation for Northern Ireland, the first year’s 
budget was used to fund a fuel poverty scheme instead. Second, OFMDFM’s 
Delivering Social Change programme aims to develop a Social Strategy which will 
parallel the Executive’s Economic Strategy. Six ‘signature projects’ involve 
education, family support and the social economy (OFMDFM web site; see also 
OFMDFM, 2013). It is unclear how, if at all, this programme interacts with Lifetime 
Opportunities or indeed with the more specific Child Poverty Strategy outlined below.  
Other programmes: fuel poverty, rural poverty and child poverty 
Three specific poverty-related areas also have their own strategies, even though 
they are included in ‘Lifetime Opportunities’. Fuel poverty is a serious issue in 
Northern Ireland due to higher energy costs and the use of more expensive domestic 
heating oil rather than gas for central heating. Poor insulation also plays a part (NIA, 
2009). Fuel poverty strategy is the responsibility of the Department for Social 
Development (DSD). The 2004 document Ending Fuel Poverty: A Strategy for 
Northern Ireland planned to end fuel poverty in vulnerable households by 2010 and 
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in non-vulnerable households in 2016. Various inter-departmental committees have 
attempted to co-ordinate action on fuel poverty over the years, for example the Fuel 
Poverty Task Force in 2008 which led to a review of the 2004 Strategy (NIA, 2009; 
Liddell et al, 2011). The current Strategy, Warmer Healthier Homes: A New Fuel 
Poverty Strategy for Northern Ireland, has the more modest aim ‘to target available 
resources on those vulnerable households who are most in need of help’, whilst also 
stating that ‘the eradication of fuel poverty must remain as a core goal of our efforts’ 
through cross-departmental partnership working (DSD, 2011: 4). The Strategy also 
continues funding for the Warm Homes scheme for owner occupiers and private 
rented sector, which had been introduced in the 2004 Strategy. An important link with 
area-based regeneration initiatives has been made through the work of Walker et al 
(2012) who have devised a methodology for identifying clusters of households at risk 
of fuel poverty, and Liddell and Langdon (2013) who carried out the initial research to 
target households for Warm Homes grants, for those whose fuel poverty could be 
overlooked as they are not social housing tenants. 
The 2009-11 Rural Anti-Poverty and Social Inclusion Framework aimed ‘to identify 
where gaps exist in the fight against poverty and exclusion in rural areas, and sets 
out how they might be addressed through innovative, partnership led approaches 
with other government departments and stakeholders’ (DARD, 2009: 3). Four key 
priorities were identified: fuel poverty, community development, rural transport and 
access, and childcare. There was also a programme to encourage proposals from 
local groups for projects to address poverty and social exclusion. The programme 
had a budget of £10m (DARD, 2009). Its successor, Tackling Rural Poverty and 
Social Isolation Framework (2012) is worth up to £16m and includes action similar to 
the previous period with the addition of initiatives on youth employability and 
entrepreneurship, health checks, and services for older people (NIE, 2012). 
Child poverty remains a particular problem in Northern Ireland (Horgen, 2007; 
Horgen and Monteith, 2009; Horgen, 2011). Improving Life Chances: The Child 
Poverty Strategy is the response to the UK’s Child Poverty Act 2010 and reiterates 
the target of eradication of child poverty by 2020 which also appears in ‘Lifetime 
Opportunities’. The overall aim is ‘to provide the opportunity for all our children and 
young people to thrive and to address the causes and consequences of 
disadvantage’ (OFMDFM, 2011b: 10). Key policy areas include education, childcare, 
health, family support, housing, neighbourhoods, financial support and parental 
employment and skills. The Strategy covers the period 2011-14 with a progress 
report required in 2012; in fact to date two annual reports have been produced. 
During this period, child poverty rates have fallen to 21 per cent, but this is 
acknowledged to be due to a fall in the UK’s median income rather than an increase 
in living standards (OFMDFM, 2013). Recent projections of relative and absolute 
poverty rates to the target date of 2020 have concluded that any previous gains will 
be reversed due to welfare reform and low wages, therefore the Child Poverty Act 
target will not be met (Brown et al, 2013). 
2.2.3. Analysis of regeneration and anti-poverty initiatives 1999-2013 
Devolution in Northern Ireland was regarded as a positive step because it involved 
politicians from the two communities governing together, albeit in an enforced 
coalition. However, the political context during the period 1998-2013 was not always 
straightforward. The Assembly and Executive were suspended between 2002 and 
2007, a period in which nevertheless a number of important policies were agreed 
included ‘People and Place’ (DSD, 2003b) and ‘Lifetime Opportunities’ (OFMDFM, 
2006). Soon after the re-establishment of regional government, the global financial 
crisis began to impact on an already weak economy. In addition, violence and civil 
unrest did not completely cease although it was obviously at a much lower level than 
during the troubles. 
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In both policy areas, but particularly in regeneration, a large number of sometimes 
overlapping initiatives have been introduced: for example, the many programmes in 
North Belfast; the overlap in Derry/Londonderry between the Ilex URC and the City 
Council; and the place of ‘Lifetime Opportunities’ as an overarching anti-poverty and 
social exclusion strategy when separate strategies also exist for fuel poverty, rural 
areas and children. It might have been thought that the influence of other UK 
jurisdictions would have led to a more streamlined approach, however, the number of 
initiatives increased compared to the pre-devolution period. In regeneration, it is 
notable that that the focus on the most disadvantaged 10 per cent (in itself, 
interpreted loosely) has been supplemented by programmes for areas just above this 
threshold (Areas at Risk) and for small areas that may have been overlooked 
(SPODs), thus widening areas of potential benefit should there be complaints about 
allocations being made disproportionately to one community. Adamson (2010: 20) 
noted from interviews that ‘any actions on one side of the sectarian divide had to be 
replicated on the other’ and that Assembly politicians were perceived by officials to 
be more interested in ensuring resources for their community rather than supporting 
responses to objective need.  
Several regeneration evaluations during this period identified problems such as a 
lack of baseline data; targets, outputs or outcomes that could not be measured 
easily; programme delays; inefficiency and poor management (DSD, 2010; PWC, 
2005; Cartmin, 2013) and in one case underspending (Murtagh and Copeland, 
2008). Instances of overlapping programmes in the same target areas raise the 
possibility of unidentified deadweight and displacement. The need for a more 
focused approach to evaluation had been identified in the early 2000s (Tyler et al, 
2002) but had not been adopted at that time. For example, the comprehensive 
approach to programme evaluation adopted by England’s New Deal for Communities 
(NDC) could have been a model. The NDC evaluation included household 
questionnaires in both NDC areas and in other equivalent non-funded areas, thus 
strengthening the qualitative element as well as including rigourous use of 
quantitative data (Lawless et al, 2010). More recently, attempts to improve have 
been evident, for example in the PEACE III programme (although initially 
unsuccessful) and the Urban Regeneration and Community Development Policy 
Framework. The evaluation of both process and outcomes, and the impact on 
community cohesion, will continue to be important as regeneration transfers to the 
local councils in 2015. Community planning may provide a new incentive for the use 
of outcomes models, but it will be important to achieve a synthesis between 
assessment of regeneration and (wider) community planning achievements which 
could include local anti-poverty initiatives. 
Overarching anti-poverty strategies since 1998 continued to adopt a mainstreaming 
approach, as did the child poverty strategy, thus making them very reliant on other 
departments (and, after 2015, local councils) for results. All these programmes have 
a strong connection with regeneration policy and strategies through the concept of 
social exclusion, with anti-poverty strategies continuing to include area-based 
multiple deprivation in their objectives or priorities.  
Organisational synergy under devolution appears to have remained weak despite 
cross-departmental working parties, and indeed the evaluation of New TSN found 
many of the same implementation difficulties from TSN still remained. The recent 
Delivering Social Change initiative appears to be an acknowledgement that there is a 
need to simplify and prioritise anti-poverty work, but it is unclear how the production 
of a new Social Strategy will impact on existing strategies. The difference in poverty 
levels between the two main communities remains a concern; the continuing spatial 
segregation of the two communities in disadvantaged areas is not as prominent an 
issue in regeneration policy, although it is acknowledged. 
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3 3. Conclusions 
3.1. Regeneration initiatives over time 
In Northern Ireland, all regeneration programmes since the late 1970s retained a 
comprehensive approach (with the exception of social housing) and a commitment to 
social and economic benefit, and there has been no alteration is this approach since 
the change of UK government in 2010. Even the Laganside UDC was a modified 
version without planning powers and with an increased community focus during the 
1990s. The recent privately run Titanic Quarter development is the exception that 
proves the rule. There may be a number of reasons for this consistency. Northern 
Ireland’s weak economy has meant that improving employment prospects has 
always been important; social deprivation such as poverty and poor health has been 
exacerbated by the troubles; and the emphasis on community development and 
public participation provides an implied or, later, more overt connection with the 
policy imperative to improve relations between the Protestant and Catholic 
communities. Programmes have usually been targeted on areas of multiple 
deprivation, although with a certain amount of leeway to allow for political concerns 
and without competitive bidding for programme funds. Resource allocation has 
always been tightly controlled by government and again this may well be in order to 
ensure the perception of fairness. EU and rural initiatives, which on the surface were 
not so carefully targeted, have in practice skewed their funds towards deprived 
areas. The fragmentation of initiatives identified before devolution continued 
thereafter, despite the introduction of a strategic urban regeneration approach 
through ‘People and Place’. The separation of social housing regeneration 
programmes from the comprehensive approach has not proved problematic because 
the Housing Executive has run these programmes efficiently and developed good 
connections with other agencies and with communities. However, the restructuring of 
social housing will abolish the Housing Executive in its present form, and it is unclear 
whether the new housing management bodies will be able to continue this tradition. 
Some post-devolution evaluations identified problems with measuring performance, 
evident in the greater focus on outcome-related evaluation. However, the connection 
between regeneration and community relations, especially in the EU-funded 
programmes, means that it is important in Northern Ireland to retain an element of 
process evaluation. Adamson (2010:20) concluded that there had been ‘a significant 
lack of impact of regeneration policy in Northern Ireland’. Certainly, despite some 
gains, the same areas continue to feature in deprivation indicators. Given that 
regeneration in Northern Ireland has been as much concerned with ‘people’ as with 
‘place’, it is unclear why. It may be that people who do better leave these areas; 
perhaps training courses are not matched to the types of jobs actually available; or, 
given the levels of worklessness connected with ill-health including the trauma of the 
troubles, perhaps not enough attention is paid to the situation of those who are not in 
the labour market. The issue of intractable spatial deprivation is by no means unique 
to Northern Ireland; rather, it is at the heart of regeneration policy and practice. 
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3.2. Anti-poverty initiatives and regeneration 
Regeneration and anti-poverty have been developed and implemented separately, 
within complex government structures including twelve regional level departments 
and a larger number of quangos than in the rest of the UK. Both before and after 
devolution, anti-poverty work has been the responsibility of central departments 
(Northern Ireland Office and OFMDFM), as befits its mainstreaming approach. 
However, work on rural poverty continues to be led by DARD and fuel poverty by 
DSD, providing potentially closer links with regeneration especially in the rural case. 
Urban regeneration was led by the Department of the Environment in NI before 
devolution and since then by the DSD; rural regeneration has been administered 
separately by the Department of Agriculture and post-1998 by DARD. The Northern 
Ireland Housing Executive has also played important strategic and implementation 
roles over the years. OFMDFM’s recent involvement in the administration of the 
Social Investment Fund, presented as a regeneration initiative, appears to be 
duplicating other targeted initiatives. In addition, EU programmes are administered 
by the SEUPB, with the additional involvement of the Department of Finance and 
Personnel, and urban regeneration (but not rural) will become the responsibility of 
restructured local councils in 2015. There is no sign that efficiency measures will 
include a reduced number of government departments.  
The concepts of social exclusion and multiple deprivation have led to a clear 
understanding of spatial disadvantage as part of anti-poverty initiatives, dating back 
to TSN’s commitment to focus public expenditure more closely on areas of need and 
identification of priority areas through deprivation indicators. Regeneration 
programmes such as Making Belfast Work and the Londonderry Initiative were 
claimed as successes for TSN, in comparison with the failure of the mainstreaming 
approach across government overall. New TSN carried forward this perspective. But 
in each case, spatial deprivation was only part of the picture, and correctly so. The 
2006 Lifetime Opportunities strategy retained the dual focus on spatial disadvantage 
and excluded groups, as did the rural strategy, however the Child Poverty and Fuel 
Poverty strategies are more based on individual circumstances. A wider awareness 
of programmes across government that contribute to alleviating poverty has been 
demonstrated recently (OFMDFM, 2012; NIA, 2012). It is striking that anti-poverty 
initiatives have been more overt about the difference in the poverty level between 
Protestant and Catholic communities, again back to the start of TSN. The issue is 
more complex when considering social exclusion, for example due to educational 
underachievement in disadvantaged Protestant areas. 
3.3. Regeneration’s contribution to anti-poverty objectives 
It is possible to conclude that regeneration has contributed to reducing social 
exclusion, although the same pattern of spatial disadvantage persists. The emphasis 
on community development and projects such as childcare have focused on creating 
community resilience and social capital, which have helped to address social 
exclusion and ‘getting by’ in poor areas. The concepts of social exclusion and 
multiple deprivation have been shared between the two policy areas and 
regeneration policies are referred to regularly in anti-poverty strategies.  
It is less clear that regeneration has contributed to the reduction of income poverty. 
Regeneration programmes have consistently emphasised the importance of 
economic development, training and education, job creation, and the social 
economy. The programmes themselves have also created jobs. Many regeneration 
programmes have produced impressive outputs relating to job creation, access to 
training, and business support. Examples include Making Belfast Work, the Rural 
Development Initiative, LEADER II, PEACE I, People and Place, and PEACE II. Yet 
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poverty levels in Northern Ireland remain high and the context for both regeneration 
and anti-poverty initiatives is becoming more difficult. The post-financial crisis 
economic weakness in Northern Ireland will be exacerbated further by upcoming 
public sector restructuring and welfare reform. 
3.4. ‘Localism’ in Northern Ireland 
It is difficult to conceptualise what localism means in the Northern Ireland context. 
The state has reacted to the history of conflict by removing many services from local 
democratic control in the early 1970s, and the current Reform of Public 
Administration will still leave housing, social services and education in the hands of 
appointed boards. To illustrate the contrast, development control decisions in 
Northern Ireland are currently taken by local offices of the regional level Planning 
Service, in consultation with local councils. The power will be delegated to local 
councils in 2015, however strategic planning and development control decisions for 
economically significant applications will be retained at regional level. Uniquely within 
the UK and Ireland, ‘planning gain’ provisions do not include social or affordable 
housing.  
There is no equivalent of England’s Localism Act 2011. The idea that local councils 
could vary policies would be regarded as very problematic within the equality 
provisions of the 1998 Northern Ireland Act, which greatly influence public 
administration practice. Decision-making in relation to regeneration programmes 
continues to be affected by sectarian divisions in society, for example the selection of 
eligible areas and structures of participation. These divisions are the basis of political 
structures and can lead to accusations of unfairness in resource allocation, which 
can make officials cautious. On the other hand, no party is championing a cuts 
agenda; the clientilist approach to protecting resources for one’s ‘community’ leads 
to a reluctance to cut back on public services. 
Local government currently has little power in Northern Ireland and it appears that 
new responsibilities in 2015 will be implemented within tightly controlled guidance. 
This has particular implications for urban regeneration, as the responsibility for 
implementation and local strategy will move to the councils but within the regional 
level Urban Regeneration and Community Development Framework. Quangos such 
as the Northern Ireland Housing Executive are also coming under closer scrutiny, 
and in the case of the Housing Executive this is leading to a major restructuring 
which will separate out management, strategic and regulatory functions. The large 
and well organised voluntary and community sector is influential in policy 
development, for example its role in the anti-poverty strategy consultation in 2004-
05. There are instances of local level voluntary or community sector service delivery, 
such as social economy businesses. But the Coalition’s ‘Big Society’ agenda has not 
gained any traction in the region. Unelected Partnership bodies have strengthened 
the influence of the community and voluntary sector at the expense of local 
councillors, but at the same time they have been able to involve groups and 
individuals who would avoid local politics due to its territorial nature.   
Therefore policy-making and implementation in Northern Ireland could be seen as 
‘hollowed out’, with the more powerful civil society actors in direct contact with 
regional level senior official and politicians and local government (with the possible 
exception of Belfast and Derry) seen as less influential. In general, administrative 
structures are more complex than the rest of the UK and decision-making can be 
slow. This has affected regeneration (as acknowledged by Adamson, 2010) and to a 
lesser extent anti-poverty work. Despite a recent move towards outcome-oriented 
programmes, regeneration in Northern Ireland continues with the separately funded 
comprehensive area-based approach that has been abandoned in England, without 
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becoming more collectivist and social democratic in its policies as can be seen in 
Scotland and Wales. 
3.5. The future 
The question of how regeneration initiatives might better contribute to anti-poverty 
strategy in future is similar in Northern Ireland to the rest of the UK, albeit played out 
in a different context. Northern Ireland’s economy remains comparatively weak within 
the UK and all policy continues to be implemented against the background of 
sectarian division and occasional low level violence. Devolved government appears 
stable after a shaky start, however the system of enforced coalition and territorial 
politics leads to slow and cautious decision-making by politicians and officials alike. 
Structural change after 2015 will move the majority of regeneration programmes to 
the local councils, whereas anti-poverty strategies will remain largely at regional 
level.  
Addressing ‘poverty’ may be defined as tackling either material forms of poverty 
(income or deprivation) or its broader social dimensions (social exclusion) (Crisp et 
al., 2014). In Northern Ireland, anti-poverty strategies have always concentrated on 
social exclusion, including attempts to decrease income poverty through improving 
access to employment. Therefore regeneration has been identified consistently as an 
important aspect of anti-poverty work. Regeneration has involved targeted resources 
whereas anti-poverty strategies have been based largely on a generally ineffective 
‘mainstreaming’ approach. With a few exceptions, regeneration initiatives consult 
with local people whereas it is arguable that the anti-poverty agenda has been 
captured by elites, meaning that it is hard to determine the kind of assistance people 
in poverty might actually want. The new councils have scope to incorporate anti-
poverty objectives more overtly into their regeneration strategies and to include 
specific income poverty outcomes in their evaluation approach, along with increasing 
community involvement in the policy area through the community planning process. 
However, the complexity of Northern Ireland’s public administration system may well 
continue to prevent effective joined up action. 
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